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We investigate the dynamics of a trust game on a mixed population where individuals with the
role of buyers are forced to play against a predetermined number of sellers, whom they choose
dynamically. Agents with the role of sellers are also allowed to adapt the level of value for money
of their products, based on payoff. The dynamics undergoes a transition at a specific value of the
strategy update rate, above which an emergent cartel organization is observed, where sellers have
similar values of below optimal value for money. This cartel organization is not due to an explicit
collusion among agents; instead it arises spontaneously from the maximization of the individual
payoffs. This dynamics is marked by large fluctuations and a high degree of unpredictability for
most of the parameter space, and serves as a plausible qualitative explanation for observed elevated
levels and fluctuations of certain commodity prices.
Modern societies are complex systems, where observed
macroscopic properties are the emergent result of collec-
tive actions of individual agents. The most commonly
adopted scenario assumes that agents select strategies
which are perceived to be in their own best interest. This
decision, however, must often be made without full a pri-
ori knowledge of the most likely outcome, and thus must
rely on some notion of belief, or trust. Common examples
include most types of markets, where buyers must decide
if a certain product is worth its cost, and sellers must de-
cide which price they should assign for their products. At
the most fundamental level, this problem can be framed
as a trust game [1–3], where a buyer must decide whether
he buys a product at a given cost, and the seller decides
which cost to select. If the price is perceived to be fair by
both parties, the outcome is positive for both of them,
otherwise it slants in favor of either party. A real market,
however, is composed of many buyers and sellers, and de-
pending on the situation, buyers do not have the option
of not buying, instead they can only realistically choose
from whom they buy. This is often the case, for instance,
for car owners who must buy gasoline, people who must
buy groceries, bank account and credit card owners, etc.
In this Letter, we investigate the dynamics of a trust
game on a population of agents who face this restriction,
and form an adaptive network of interactions [4–12]. We
identify the emergence of an effective cartel-like dynam-
ics, where agents share low values of value for money, to
the overall benefit of the sellers and detriment of the buy-
ers. This cartel dynamics emerges without any explicit
collusion among the agents, who react independently in
order to maximize their payoff. In this dynamical phase,
the evolution of the average value for money in the pop-
ulation is marked by very large fluctuations, and high
degree of unpredictability, with aperiodic behavior and
very broad spectral densities. These variations are a
result of a never-ending tug-of-war between sellers and
buyers, where buyers seek the best sellers, who in turn
compete among themselves, while at the same time ben-
efiting collectively from uniformly low value for money.
This type of dynamics can be directly compared to the
time evolution of certain commodity prices such as gaso-
line, which is known to fluctuate considerably between
gas stations [13–15], both in space and time, sometimes
with multiple price changes within a single day, without
any apparent connection to the fluctuation of crude oil
prices. Our model provides a conceptual explanation of
the origin of such fluctuations, which does not require
the explicit collusion among the sellers as a necessary
element driving price changes.
Our model is defined as follows. We consider a pop-
ulation of N agents, where each agent has two simulta-
neous roles: donator (e.g. a buyer) and rewarder (e.g. a
seller). To each agent i we assign a value for money vari-
able wi ∈ [0, 1]. This can be interpreted, for instance, as
the quality of a sold product or service. Each agent is
forced to choose exactly K rewarders to whom it must
donate [16]. This forms a network of N nodes, where
the adjacency matrix Aij describes the donators’ choices.
Each agent i has a donator and a rewarder payoff, P+i
and P−i , respectively, defined as,
P+i =
∑
j
Aijwj (1)
P−i = (1− wi)ki, (2)
where ki =
∑
j Aji is the number of donators who choose
agent i (the in-degree of i). Eq. 1 can be interpreted
simply as the overall satisfaction a customer has with his
buying choices, and Eq. 2 as the overall profit a business
makes, which is assumed proportional to how many cus-
tomers it has, ki, and to the complement of the value for
money it provides, 1−wi. We assume these payoff values
correspond to continued interactions between players, in-
stead of single isolated events (e.g. repeated games after
an unspecified number of rounds), and are accumulated
on a time scale which is much faster than the strategy up-
date dynamics. The strategies of each agent correspond
to their chosen value for money wi, and their choice of
rewarders. These strategies are updated dynamically as
follows. At each time step, a agent i is randomly cho-
sen. With probability a its rewarder strategy is updated,
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2otherwise its donator strategy is updated. The actual
strategy updates are performed according to the follow-
ing rules:
1. Donator update. For the agent i, a random, cur-
rently chosen rewarder j is selected, so that Aij =
1, and compared with another rewarder l 6= j, with
Ail = 0, randomly chosen among the entire popu-
lation. If wl ≥ wj , then the rewarder is replaced,
i.e. Aij → 0 and Ail → 1.
2. Rewarder update. For the agent i, another agent
j 6= i is randomly selected from the population. If
P−j ≥ P−i , then its value for money is copied, i.e.
wi ← wj .
Thus the donator strategies are updated by simple com-
parison, and the rewarder strategies are updated by repli-
cation. This is so chosen, since it is always better for a
donator to switch to a better rewarder, whereas it is not
a priori obvious which is the best value for money a re-
warder should select: If the value w for a given agent is
lowered, the higher will be its payoff immediately, but
on the other hand, the larger is the likelihood it will lose
donators as soon as they update their strategies. Con-
versely, if the value of w is increased, it will decrease
the rewarders payoff immediately, but it may attract
more donators in the future, which will then cause an
increased payoff. Replication based on payoff automati-
cally chooses the strategies which are more successful at
a given stage, and is thus the most commonly adopted
scenario in evolutionary game theory [3].
We investigate the dynamics of this model by simulat-
ing a population of N = 106 agents, as well as obtaining
some properties analytically in the limit N → ∞. In
order to avoid absorbing states where a single value for
money is fixated on the entire population, we introduce
a small noise probability r = 10−6 that at each time
step a randomly chosen agent acquires a random value of
w ∈ [0, 1]. The dynamics will depend strongly on the pa-
rameter a, which controls the relative speed with which
rewarders update their strategies, when compared to do-
nators. If this value is too low, the donators will react
fast enough to changes in available value for money, se-
lecting those with higher w values, and only these agents
will have a larger rewarder payoff, and thus the dynam-
ics will settle on a stable fixed point where the entire
population has the same value of w, witch tends asymp-
totically to one, as can be seen is Fig. 1a. In this situation
all rewarders will on average receive the same number of
donators, which will be distributed according to a Pois-
son. This is the ideal scenario for donators, but the worst
possible for rewarders, since their average payoff values
reach their maximum and minimum values, respectively.
However, as the remaining panels of Fig. 1 show, this sit-
uation changes as a is increased. For values of a > ac,
where ac is a critical value depending on K, the aver-
age value for money 〈w〉 fluctuates around values smaller
than one, since the rewarders are quick enough to copy
low values of w, so that there are few higher values of w
left in the population, before the donators have a chance
to react. The values of w remain low since there are no
other options for the donators to choose from. This is an
emergent cartel-like dynamical phase, since all rewarders
have settled on a range of w values which is beneficial to
the entire population of rewarders, and detrimental to the
population of donators, which are left with a restricted
choice. However the values of 〈w〉 are not quite stable and
fluctuate tremendously, due to influence of the donators
and the always ongoing competition between rewarders.
In Fig. 2a can be seen the phase diagram for diverse
values ofK, which show the emergence of the cartel phase
at a critical value of ac, after which the 〈w〉 = 1 ceases
to be stable. The stability of this fixed point can be
accessed by a linear stability analysis: If this fixed point
is perturbed by the inclusion of a small fraction of agents
with a lower value of w < 1, the time evolution of the
probability density ρ(k,w) of agents with this w value
and in-degree k is given by,
∂
∂t
ρ(k,w) ∼= aP0(k)(1− δk,0)
∑
k′>0
ρ(k′, w)+
(1− a)
[
k + 1
〈k〉 ρ(k + 1, w)−
k
〈k〉ρ(k,w)
]
, (3)
where P0(k) is a Poisson distribution with average K,
and terms of order O(ρ(k′, w)2) were neglected (see Eq. 4
below for the full master equation). The first term of
Eq. 3 corresponds simply to the probability of rewarders
adopting the invading strategy, whereas the second term
accounts for the probability of agents with the invading
strategy losing donators. Eq. 3 is a linear system, and
thus can be written in the form x˙ = Mx, where xi are
the individual ρ(k,w) variables, and M is a matrix cor-
responding to the right-hand side of Eq. 3. If the value
of a is large enough so that the real part of an eigenvalue
of M becomes larger than zero, Reλ > 0, the fixed point
ceases to be stable. By numerically computing λ, one can
find the value of a = ac for which Reλ = 0. These values
predict exactly the transition point, as Fig. 2b shows.
Exactly at the critical value a = ac, the oscillations
of 〈w〉 show typical critical behavior, with sharp jumps
from the average value close to one, corresponding to re-
peated successful invasions of low value for money, which
disappear after a relatively short time. Interestingly, the
variance of the average value over time, σ〈w〉, is largest
not exactly at the critical point, but at values a > ac
close to it, as Fig. 3a shows. Exactly for the values of
a for which σ〈w〉 is maximum, one obtains an universal
behavior for the in-degree distribution of agents (accu-
mulated over the entire history), which exhibits a power
law tail of the form P (k) ∼ k−3 (see Fig. 3b). For larger
values of a the fluctuations diminish but remain signifi-
cant. Indeed the P (k) distributions are broad for almost
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FIG. 1. Time evolution of the average value for money 〈w〉,
in a population of N = 106 agents with different values of K
and a. The lower right panel (d) shows a zoomed region of
the lower left panel (c).
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FIG. 2. (a) Phase diagram showing the average value for
money 〈w〉 over time, as a function of a, in a population of
N = 106 agents with different values of K. The error bars
indicate the variance of the time series (not of the average).
(b) The same curves as in (a) scaled according to the critical
value ac, calculated from Eq. 3.
the entire parameter space, as the remaining panels of
Fig. 3 show.
A visual analysis of the temporal evolution of the val-
ues of 〈w〉 cannot reveal the precise characteristics of
the fluctuations, e.g. whether it is aperiodic or quasi-
periodic. In Fig. 4 is shown the spectral density of the
time series, revealing very broad spectra, compatible with
aperiodic behavior. For values of a close to 1, a 1/fα
spectrum is clearly identified, with α ∼= 3/2. For lower
values of a, the spectrum is divided roughly into lower
and high frequency regions, with stronger fluctuations at
lower frequencies. The lower-frequency spectrum is sig-
nificantly broad, and is compatible with a 1/fα decay,
with exponents in the range α ∈ [3/2, 1/2].
The exact dynamics which give rise to the observed
fluctuations can be explored more closely by specifying
the full master equation which describes the behavior of
the system in the limit N → ∞. For practical reasons,
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FIG. 3. (a) Variance of the average value for money 〈w〉 over
time, as a function of a, for different K. (b) Rescaled in-
degree distribution, accumulated over the entire history, for
the values of a for which σ〈w〉 is maximum. Lower panels: In-
degree distributions for K = 5 (c) and 10 (d), and different
values of a.
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
f
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
S
(f
)
a = 0.556607
a = 0.59
a = 0.69
a = 0.79
a = 0.89
a = 0.99
(a) K = 1
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
f
10−10
10−9
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
S
(f
)
a = 0.164836
a = 0.26
a = 0.44
a = 0.63
a = 0.81
a = 0.99
(b) K = 3
FIG. 4. Power spectral density for the time series of 〈w〉, and
different values ofK and a. The dotted and dashed lines show
1/fα curves with α = 3/2 and α = 1/2, respectively.
we assume now that the values of wi must be chosen from
a discrete set of Nw elements distributed uniformly in the
[0, 1] range. Taking the limit Nw →∞, one recovers the
exact same model as before. One can describe the time
evolution of the probability P (k,w) of observing a agent
with value for money w and in-degree k as,
∂
∂t
P (k,w) = aγ(k,w) + (1− a)ξ(k,w) (4)
where γ(k,w) and ξ(k,w) describe the rewarder repli-
cation and donator comparison dynamics, respectively.
The term γ(k,w) is defined as,
γ(k,w) =
∑
w′ 6=w
P (k,w′)P˜k
(
k
1− w′
1− w ,w
)
−
P (k,w)
∑
w′ 6=w
P˜k
(
k
1− w
1− w′ , w
′
)
, (5)
where P˜k(k,w) =
∑
k′≥k P (k
′, w). The first term in Eq. 5
4corresponds to the probability of randomly selected agent
with a lower or equal payoff k′(1−w′) selecting w as the
new strategy, and the second term to the probability of an
agent with strategy w finding another agent with higher
or equal payoff and a different value w′. The term ξ(k,w)
describes the change in P (k,w) which is due to donators
selecting different rewarders, and is given by,
ξ(k,w) =
k + 1
〈k〉 P (k + 1, w)
(
P˜w(w)− P (k,w)
)
− k〈k〉P (k,w)
(
P˜w(w)− P (k − 1, w)
)
+ P (k − 1, w)
(
P˜ ∗w(w)−
k
〈k〉P (k,w)
)
− P (k,w)
(
P˜ ∗w(w)−
k + 1
〈k〉 P (k + 1, w)
)
, (6)
where P˜w(w) =
∑
k′,w′≥w P (k
′, w′) and P˜ ∗w(w) =∑
k′,w′≥w P (k
′, w′)k′/〈k〉. The fist two terms in Eq. 6
correspond to the probability of a rewarder with strat-
egy w losing a donator due to a comparison with a ran-
dom rewarder with a higher or equal value w′. The two
remaining terms describe the converse probability of a re-
warder receiving a donator from another rewarder with
value w′ ≤ w. The time evolution of P (k,w) for a > ac
is shown in Fig. 5, starting from a random configura-
tion where all values of w are equally probable, and the
in-degree distribution is a Poisson for all values of w. Ini-
tially, the mass of the distribution shifts to lower values of
w as agents adopt a value for money with a larger payoff.
Simultaneously, the upper left portion of the distribu-
tion increases in mass, since the rewarders with larger w
receive more donators. Eventually the payoff of the re-
warders with high w and k will be large enough to drive
the entire distribution upwards. At this point, all re-
warders will receive approximately the same number of
donators, and the system will become susceptible to an
invasion of low value for money. Due to the same dy-
namics as before, the new front of low value for money
will move upwards in the w axis, prompting the eventual
appearance of yet another front, and so on. Although
this corresponds to cycles of average value for money, the
whole dynamics is aperiodic, and is not easy to predict
when the next front will come, and how it will interact
with the preceding ones. This dynamics of succeeding
fronts proceeds indefinitely, and the system never settles
on a fixed point.
In conclusion, we have developed a minimal model of a
trust game played on a population of agents, which dis-
plays an emergent cartel-like behavior, with large fluctu-
ations of value for money. As mentioned previously, this
model provides a qualitative explanation for the price
fluctuation of certain commodity prices, such as gasoline.
As many empirical studies have shown [13], the price of
gasoline fluctuates between gas stations. The average
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FIG. 5. Temporal evolution of P (k,w), as obtained by inte-
grating Eq. 4.
price for a given city often exhibits daily variations, and
sometimes fluctuates within the same day. The average
price often rises very fast, and decay more slowly. This
type of oscillation is called Edgeworth price cycles [14],
and is predicted by simple models involving two com-
panies, which change their strategy at each round, re-
acting to the strategy played by the other company at
the previous round [14, 15]. This model, however, is not
applicable in situations involving many companies. Our
model not only assumes that there are many sellers, but
also it incorporates the behavior of the buyers explicitly.
The resulting oscillations which we observe are a result
of the competition in the entire market, not the steady
state behavior of very few companies which observe each
other directly. Furthermore, it sheds light on the ques-
tion of market regulation. It is often discussed if the
observed fluctuations are a result of collusion among the
gas companies, who attempt to increase the gas prices
in unison [13]. Although this is certainly a possibility,
our model shows that an explicit coordinated behavior
among sellers is not an indispensable requirement for a
cartel-like behavior.
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